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The issue of identity and difference is loaded with many tensions and
potentially irresolvable sets of politics of interpretation. As a result of years
of clinical work and conflict resolution, I have come to understand that on
matters of race, identity, and difference, the conception of the Other as fixed
and absolute leads to the dangerous penchant to demonize the Other. On
the other hand, the facile notion that “we are one blood” threatens a
group’s sense of self-continuity, identity, and stability.1 Even more threaten-
ing to groups is any notion of self as changing or relative because a precip-
itous readiness to change also poses a threat to a group’s identity.
In this essay, I will explore only one dimension of this larger issue:
what group analyst Farhad Dalal has called the “dominating antinomies of
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black and white.” I do this in the name of efficiency knowing that there are
many diverse shades of grey between black and white in our complex,
global, and multifaceted world. The second reason I do this is because I was
born in Ghana, West Africa, trained and practiced as a psychoanalyst in the
United Kingdom and the United States where I now live. My theoretical,
clinical, and personal reflections are more urgently focused on the antino-
mies of black and white. In short, I am to my patients an African for many
obvious, conscious and unconscious reasons. They do many things with
my Africanness. I permit this conversation with various degrees of freedom
and with different clinical consequences.
I begin this paper with theoretical references to race, racialization, and
otherness with the work of several authors and appropriate them into my
own synthesis. I shall, then, create a clinical praxis from a synthesis of views
on transference, countertransference, and other intersubjective issues from
Husserl’s and Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology. Finally, I shall demonstrate
and reflect on what it means to a representative group of my patients that I
am a Ghanaian who is engaged in the process of transformation with them
and how they use me to change their world and sometimes my own.
DIFFERENCE AND IDENTITY
At the center of the discourse on difference and identity, there lies a more pro-
found, embedded, and structured story of race, racism, and racialization. Witin
this discourse on race, racism, and racialization, there are dominating antino-
mies of “black” and “white.” It is my view that we must have familiarity with
theories that attempt to unpack these dominating structures of black and
white. Farhad Dalal, a group analyst who practices in London, has argued that
we must unpack these dominating structures of black and white to see what
patterns show themselves, to see if the associations of black and white to nega-
tive and positive, respectively, are natural. Then, we must inquire how and
when these associations are acquired if they are not natural. Finally, what func-
tions do these associations of black and white to negative and positive serve?2
Dalal has investigated notions of black and white in structures of lan-
guage in order to discover significations in their social contexts. Racism, he
has proposed, depends on groups that are called “races.” Racism builds
misapprehensions even though “races” as such do not exist. In short, race
is largely an empty category, but a powerful one when it is used to create
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borders that are further deployed to create a mentality of “us” versus “them.”
How do borders get instituted to manufacture such categories?
Norbert Elias has developed a process of reductions that fuel misap-
prehensions.3 I have summarized his process (with my own emphasis) in
the follow way:
1. After abstraction, that which is abstracted may have a life of its own.
From this a second error occurs.
2. The general is made prior to the particular. That is, the abstraction or
idea of a thing is made prior to the thing itself.
3. A generalization follows that transcends time-as-past, time-as-present,
and time as-future.
4. Purity, then, can be found in the idea, not the actualization of the
idea. When actualization makes the idea material, it is imagined to have
been corrupted.
The blackening and whitening forces in this schema are located in a larger
historical stream propelled by the following Enlightenment assumptions:
the passions are repudiated, subjugated, and repressed by relating them to
the animal realm; persons of color are equally relegated to the animal do-
main; and European identity borrows the whitening process to serve pro-
cesses of differentiation. Psychoanalytically, the incompatible, the repu-
diated, and repressed go down into the Unconscious. Through a process of
splitting, repression, and projection, the passions are injected into persons
of color to “purify,” as it were, the European identity.
The work of Argentinean psychoanalyst Ignacio Matte-Blanco takes us
from abstraction to antagonism.4 In Matte-Blanco’s schema, our minds freeze
human processes into states. It is as if our minds could only deal in finitudes.
This tendency to freeze processes into states and to deal in finitudes obliges us
to break up infinite processes into fragmented states of bits and pieces. To this
argument, I would add the so-called Cartesian splits (figure 1) that follow from
this account as if there were no “worlds,” “horizons” or experiential third
worlds between them. Following Matte-Blanco, symmetrical logic is the logic
of infinity where things that would otherwise be different are thought to be
identical. In this logic where nothing changes because infinity is so big, sym-
metrical logic homogenizes. It is the logic of sameness.
In contrast to symmetrical logic, asymmetrical logic is the logic of
finite space and time. Difference matters and is operationalized as either-or.
Symmetrical logic, then, differentiates. For Matte-Blanco a combination of
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symmetrical and asymmetrical logic is privileged. All thought is a combina-
tion of both forms of logic. The result is that there are sometimes “globules
of similarity in a sea of difference,” and at other times globules of uncon-
scious in a sea of consciousness.5 Instability emerges.
RACE AND PROCESSES OF RACIALIZATION
When we put together identity as an outcome of process reduction and
identity as unstable with the pressure to whiten or blacken a group, the re-
sult is that all identities become continually threatened by the presence of
other hidden relationships which in turn threaten to burst in and destroy
any semblance of coherence and self-continuity. How does a group then
deal with the instability of coherence of its self-sameness? By a process of
symmetrical logic, the contents of repression are totalized, conflated, and
coalesced into blackness, badness, violence, mythologies about the other’s
sensual submission to the passions, death, and “them” as in “them” and
“us.” So, if they who are unlike us submit to the passions, we are pure and
unlike them. “That one” is not like us. “That one” is not like me.
The transitional object, according to Donald Winnicott, is the first
bridge between inside and outside.6 Co-extensively, transitional phenom-
ena constitute the basis of cultural life. Between transitional objects and
transitional phenomena, we have the illusion of connection. Groups come
together on the basis of this illusory experience of connection. A common
name comes to bind them—a process that leads to a reification of a shared
name. The urgency that accompanies this reification betrays the anxiety
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Figure 1. Ignacio Matte-Blanco’s Schema
Outside – Inside
Individual – Society
Body – Mind
Free Will – Determinism
Death Instinct – Life Instincts
Finite – Infinite
Essence – Accidents
Meaning – Significance
The Real – The Ostensible
Symmetrical Logic – Asymmetrical Logic
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that the illusory sense of connectedness may not last. Hence, there is a need
in the group to vigorously defend its name and its function.
British group psychoanalyst S.H. Foulkes has proposed that the inner
processes of individuals are the result of internalization of forces operating in
the group to which they belong. Racialized structures are part of these forces
that operate in the social group. Therefore, these forces become internalized as
parts of the structures of experiences of the group’s individual members.
Blackening and whitening are aspects of these structuring forces that lead the
conscious and unconscious domains of mind to become embedded as
dichotomies. Humans favor those who belong to the same named grouping
by reducing difference within and maximizing or exaggerating difference
between groups. Who am I becomes where I belong. Sameness is sustained
by subjugating internal differences and by suppressing external sameness.
To sustain self-same group coherence and illusions of intactness, idealiza-
tion and denigration are deployed. Emotions are mobilized to organize the re-
lations between people and to reflect the power relations that operate between
them. Armed with the conceptual tools of Elias, Foulkes, Winnicott, among
others, Dalal can now create the following synthesis: at the societal level,
“groupings are cathected so that the projections of all individuals are patterned
by the types of power relations that prevail. It is almost always the case that it is
the more powerful that tend to be the idealized ones.”7 For Dalal then:
1. Identity is constituted by a relationship between people.
2. The functions of a grouping subserve the naming of the grouping
and the province it delineates.
3. “Who one is” or “what one is” is identical to “where” one belongs.”
4. Belongingness, however, is multiple and quite prone to creating
conflict within oneself.
5. Power is the capacity to sustain a privileged version of reality. Ide-
ology, then, enters into the work of sustaining power relations, and
to coercively persuade all participants that a particular modus oper-
andi is the natural order of the world.
6. Threats to identity come from outside when other groups seek to
subvert the status quo. Threats come from inside when there are
multiple claims on one’s identity going on simultaneously.
7. Essentializing the name of a grouping aims to reduce anxiety and
threats to identity.
8. When the name of a group is racial, there is racism.
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Dalal is consistently faithful to his view that group processes are to be
privileged as external fields of reference to the interior. My own position
differs slightly from Dalal. With a nod to Husserl’s notion of horizon, I take
the view that both external and interior fields of reference are horizonal. In
other words, although they are not interchangeable, they belong to one
intersubjective field. This one intersubjective field is where my clinical praxis
is. I shall describe it and illustrate it below with three clinical examples.
Any attempt to locate the meaning of Otherness into a fixed, single,
unifocal, and logically coherent meaning is bound to be wooden, perhaps in
error. The pretext, then, for this essay is that the most interesting readings of
the term Otherness would provide us with heterogeneity of meanings. They
would give us a circumscribed set of readings and understandings that are
not necessarily interchangeable but horizonal. All these accounts of
Otherness present scenarios that have proximity, but they are not the same.
All are proximal and within the same horizon because they tell us something
about the fate of the representational world within, without, and between
humans. There is heterogeneity of accounts of Otherness, to be sure, but
there is not identity or sameness between them. These accounts do, how-
ever, provide us with space for investigating the good, the bad and the ugly
about us humans. Humans reveal their best secrets through phenomena that
are horizonal but not necessarily interchangeable.
BASIC ASSUMPTIONS BEHIND THE CLINICAL CONTEXT
Before exploring how Otherness works in a therapeutic relationship, I present
the essential assumptions behind my clinical work. I was a student of Anna
Freud in London in the early seventies. We were steeped into psychoanalytic
metapsychology. She implored us to remember that a theory is only a plat-
form to stand on when it is needed, but it must be bracketed, suspended, or
deferred when one is listening and engaging a child. For example, she might
say: “who needs a theory of conflict when there is psychic harmony?” In an-
other context, she would insist that “when a child is telling her story her way,
let her carry out her reconfiguration of her mind without interfering with her
work.” And then she would admonish us that “interpretation and/or recon-
struction can wait. Do not interfere needlessly.”8
To begin treatment without knowing one’s metapsychological frame
or an alternative set of theories is like building a house on a piece of land
without exploring beforehand what land mines or sewer lines pre-existed.
43
IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE
Once treatment has begun, we must privilege the intrapsychic story of the
patient, parishioner, client, patient, or fellow seeker. The following state-
ments describe the work of story making that occur in the horizonal inter-
subjective field between patient and clinician. This therapeutic work occurs
in the public space, between inside and outside, between interior fields of
reference and exterior fields of reference, between the world/horizon the
patient brings into the room and the world/horizon that the clinician
brings into the room. The following statements form the metapsychological
framework for my analytic work.
1. Being is that which requires creation of us so that we may experi-
ence it [Merleau-Ponty].
2. But this creation is so urgent only because the most loving of
mothers cannot satisfy the powerful emotional needs of the child
[Melanie Klein].
3. Thus the symbol is a piece of flesh over its gap.9 If effect, there is an
epistemic gap, as it were, into which a symbol has been inscribed.
There is a cut, a gash, perhaps a permanent rupture, as it were,
when, for instance, a person is raped and robbed of her hitherto
intact self—an ideal self that will never be the same again. We live
therefore in an ek-static relation to our important others. The Attic
Greek word ek-statein means “to stand outside of ourselves.”
4. How is this gap going to be remembered in that public space be-
tween the clinician and the treated?
5. What stories will be invented to fill the gap in the new and clinical
public space?
6. What fictions will be created to provide us with an illusion of self-con-
tinuity in the presence of a new and foreign other called a clinician?
7. What new fictions will be invented or co-constructed to enable us to
extend ourselves in the new and public space?
8. We create these new fictions by translating the events of history into
a sense of history.
9. History, then, according to Paul Ricoeur, is a limit that is never attained.
10. It is an incomplete objectivity.
11. Accordingly, selections from history will be made with precarious
ordering.
12. Such a history, then, is an intellectual approximation.
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13. It is largely an imaginative projection into a new present and public
space between self and other.
14. It is effectively a real projection into another human life, an Other.
15. With the projection, or shall we say, exteriorization into another hu-
man life that will henceforth house this split-off part of the self, a di-
alectic emerges.
16. This dialectic is a strategy of reducing historical fact to a sense of
and a reconstitution of that historical fact. [Husserl]
17. This dialectic, however, has a new topography of its own. Let us
borrow from Husserl, yet again, three key terms: sedimentation, re-
activation, and the intentional sphere.
18. The topography of sedimentation, reactivation, and intentionality is
redescribed as staging, where staging is now a lived anthropologi-
cal category, rather than a reflected category.10
19. Staging, so conceived, is invariably preceded by something to
which it has given rise.
20. This emergent something lives on what it is not.
21. This new emergence that materializes stands in the service of some-
thing absent that can never become fully present.
22. Staging, then, is a form of doubling.
23. This doubling encompasses past and present.
24. It points to absence and a concrete presentation or a symbolic repre-
sentation.
25. We have a doubling and a simulacrum.
26. We have fading into history and a recall.
27. That which is staged becomes extended or supplemented to serve a
new and contemporary purpose.
28. Staging, in psychoanalysis, becomes a mode of remembering with
an Other in a transference-countertransference continuum.
29. During staging, an analyst may be pushed to remember with a patient
the grievances that were there long before there were words to speak
them. Hence, negative transference is of crucial importance of the a-
nalysis. In other words, if you are a clinician, and you have a strong
need to be liked or loved by your patient, you have a lot of work to do
on yourself so that you can take, absorb, and transform through rea-
sonably correct interpretation what hatred is purposefully being injec-
ted into you.
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OTHERNESS, TRANSFERENCE, AND COUNTERTRANSFERENCE
In this section of the essay, I intend to create a theoretical account of Otherness
that facilitates the making of the transformative intrapsychic story in psycho-
analysis.11 In the psychoanalytic setting, as in many psychotherapeutic settings,
there are two people in the room physically and any number of links between
the two persons; not to mention all the ancestors hovering in the background.
There are three levels of interaction in a psychoanalytic exchange. At
the deepest level, there is the potential for unsymbolized interaction bet-
ween two minds. A good example of this occurs when a clinician makes
what he thinks is an error, apologizes profusely to a supervisor for making
a “mistake,” and gets congratulated for intuiting what is central to a case or
clinical story. In figure 2, the solid line in the space between analyst and
analysand suggests that unconscious or unwitting transactions get played
out in action before awareness and words come to elaborate them.
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Conjoint Theory of Fusion of
Horizons in Psychoanalysis
Figure 2. Gadamer’s “Fusion of Horizons”
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In the next level, things do not just slip out. There is unmetabolized inter-
action of minds with preconscious and closer to awareness transactions. We are
aware of them, and we even recognize uncanny issues at play but patience,
elaboration, and conscious engagement of the issues will ultimately bring
transparency. We have some access into each other’s world. In that public
space, the line need not be solid, but rather a projection line where we have
some access into each other’s world. In the third level, there is a fusion of hor-
izons, to use the words of the German philosopher of hermeneutics Hans-
Georg Gadamer.12 Here we are aware of relations of power between analyst
and patient, transference and countertransference coercions from both sides
that need to be understood and transformed. We can even say that, at its best,
the work in this public space can be constituted as interchangeable supremacy.
Analyst and patient may both have to change how they see each other, how
they situate themselves in the world, how they interpret it without imposing
or harming the other. The following assumptions undergird this understand-
ing of transference and countertransference in the therapeutic setting:
! The countertransference of the analyst is an instrument of research
into the patient’s unconscious, into an Other’s mind. It is her creation.
! Transference is more than the illusory apperception of another per-
son or phenomenon. It includes the subtle and unconscious at-
tempts to manipulate or to provoke earlier and concealed reenact-
ments with others. Apperception is the construction that one brings
to a perception. It is an addendum to serve a new and contemporary
intentional purpose.
! Transference includes the patient’s projection or externalization of
the past on to the person of the analyst in order to manipulate or
provoke potentially resolvable situations with the analyst. Manipu-
lations may therefore serve purposes of trial action.
! Countertransference is an illusory apperception of an Other person
in a new space. There is a projection of instinctual or superego an-
xiety into the mental representation of an Other person or figure.
! Countertransference is an externalization of narcissistic injury into
the mental representation of an Other. And there is exteriorization
by the patient to prod the analyst to adapt to a particular way of
situating oneself in the world in order to carry out or work through
an intentional act, thought, or feeling.
These key metaphors about transference and countertransference coa-
lesce around the following statement drawn from J. Sandler: Parallel to the
“free-floating attention” of the analyst is what I should like to call his free-float-
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ing responsiveness.13 This follows two metaphors in Husserl. For him, percep-
tion is communalized in such a way that validity is altered through reciprocal
correction. Accordingly we live within the horizon of our fellow human be-
ings with whom we may enter into actual or potential contact, as we also can
do in potentially living together.14 All this is to say that analyst and patient are
implicated in what each other does. We might even add that at pivotal
moments, we are co-responsible for what each other does. And, through a
series of reciprocal translations, we move the intrapsychic story forward. The
praxis suggests that the analyst is a constituted Other. I now want to add to it
some additional comments about the transference. In this integrative praxis:
1. The negotiation of transference starts with an act of trust to venture
into the world of the analyst as a constituted stand-in. There is a
leap of faith with the assumption that someone is at home, so to
speak, who is potentially trustworthy.
2. That representational home of the analyst as a constituted stand-in
can be aggressively entered.
3. The representational home that is entered must be assimilated so
that the alien who enters it can be domesticated.
4. Finally, there must be reciprocal understanding to restore balance; a
restitution that consumes its original genesis.
VIGNETTES
With this framework in mind, we turn to vignettes from my clinical work
to ask a question about racialization in the clinical and public arena that we
call the clinical setting. More precisely, how do my patients variously use
my Otherness as a Ghanaian to advance our work of transformation?
Patient A
Before she came to me, this patient had killed off three previous analyses
and had warned that I was likely to be the fourth. She brought me a castor-
oil seed to plant in my garden to thank me for my work after one year of
analysis only to warn me the next day that if I took it home it could poison
my children or grandchildren. She insisted that I get a supervisor to ensure
a successful analysis. She is the one who came to discover with me that the
insistence on me having a supervisor was, in the transference, a wish to
ensure that her psychological birth was safer than her physical delivery
that almost caused her death because her mother was unsupervised by her
mother. Here is one representative session after her psychological delivery:
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SHE: On the inside I am still simmering, and “simmering” is the word,
about what we talked about last time. I am still quite confused. It was,
it is, meaningful for me to hear how uncertain I made you feel, and I
realized that I have never been able to create much of a circle of trust. So I feel
that I am really at an important point in the process.
I have had memories of being 9 and 10, but I don’t remember now. It was
yesterday, last night. You see, I realized the…you know…I am such at the
edge of things that I don’t know if I have the words for it. It’s visual rather than
words. I see how I grew up and what I missed. But there’s not a whole lot
of emotion. It’s just…this is the way it is; this is the way it was and, also,
what it has been in a sense of how little I understand myself. It’s unbelievable.
But I still don’t understand the difference between you as a figure and you
as the person who is the analyst. You work with yourself as a person.
I: When I feel something in the session that is uncharacteristic for me in
a particular situation I know I must pay attention: I am being recruited
to remember something with or for the patient. When I felt uncertain
these past few weeks I knew you were unconsciously inviting me to
play out something. In other words, it was information.
SHE: When you feel uncertain does that not tell you that you need a
supervisor, like an analyst who has worked with you for years and
knows how you respond to patients? I ask that because it feels like there
is a net and, it’s like, I want to jump from pretty high.
I: And you want me there to catch you and make sure you are intact when you
fall into the net. I’ll be there to make sure you are safe if you’d allow me.
SHE: Yes! I want to be safe.
I: A mother then must be motheredto be sure she can deliver you safely;
and likewise an analyst must be supervisedto make sure you are safely de-
livered from your mother’s womb in a psychological sense. You doubted
your mother; and likewise you doubt my ability to treat you successfully.
SHE: You know, I felt so sorry for my mother that I wanted to save her, spare
her. It’s deep. Yes, I doubted my mother. I don’t doubt you. I just firmly believe
that every analyst must have a supervisor. Yes, I doubted my mother and I
wanted to save her, spare her. I see my daughter Sandra doing the same thing.
I: Please continue.
SHE: There’s another thing: It is disgust that I feel with my mother and it has
to do with the birth itself. I hate to think that I came out of her. It’s physical. I
don’t like her body.
I: Describe it to me.
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SHE: I never liked her belly and I know that she doesn’t like it either. And
also, and this is an exaggeration: when I was growing up I saw my
mother pregnant most of the time. I remember her pregnant a lot. This
is my ugliest thought: when she was pregnant with my youngest broth-
er, we went out to visit some church with beautiful life sized statues.
And my mother was disgustingly pregnant. The priest made a comment
that my mother was pregnant, and I just hated it. This is after a priest,
another one, had tried to caress me and all that… .Maybe that’s the
connection to the disgust I feel for the body.
I: (After a pause) While the subject of supervision is on our minds, how
would you feel if I presented your case to my colleagues here and abroad?
SHE: You should do that! That’s not exactly what I am talking about, but
it’s close. Just as long as you take the names out. You know how to do that.
I: Yes I do.
At the end of the session, she said “Thank you.” After getting up from the
couch, she added “Whew!”
I: Some heavy lifting.
SHE: Really! Well, I’ll see you tomorrow at 10 o’clock.
I: On time, like you were today.
SHE: (Chuckles)
I: I hope it’s a new day.
SHE: Well, Sandra literally pushed me out of the door. (Chuckles some
more as she leaves.)
I notice those well chosen words: “literally pushed out of the door,” not by
forceps this time but by the daughter in a reversal of roles.
Two years after her successful analysis, I was at a movie theater. A
woman and her husband came and sat next to me. She recognized me and
plunged a big kiss on my cheek. I was stunned. She said she was coming to
see me the following week. She came. This time, she came to present me
with a picture she had been painting of a man standing in a boat in which
a woman sat. The man was, in her words, “helping her cross the river.” This
time, I thanked her and accepted it. She and her husband were on their way
to their new retirement mansion out of state.
She will always remember me as the person who rowed the boat that
enabled her to cross the river. She has changed. She has a will to live. I have
changed. I always knew as a clinician that I must be careful with gifts. How-
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ever, it never occurred to me that my life or my son’s life depended on not
accepting such a gift as I was offered: a castor oil plant whose seeds can kill.
But we lived to see us change and grow.
Patient B
Patient B came to see me in her mid-thirties because she could not sustain
any relationships. She would immerse herself in relationships until mar-
riage was proposed and then refuse the proposal. How does she use my
Otherness as a Ghanaian-born analyst? Approximately halfway through
this analysis, when she was negotiating the question of whether to become
a girl who is unambiguously female or to preserve a sense of self as defec-
tive and/or bisexual, she noticed a particular pattern or flow of repetitions
with a thread running through them. Intrigued by what she was doing, how
she was engaging the intricacies of her own mind, she pondered: “I am thinking
what you have done to get me to this point; your technique.”Asked to intuit what
she thought and to share her observation, she said: “It’s in the alliance, but there
is a certain order that I notice. You organize a series of focuses.”All I feel able to say
is the following: “Let’s just say that you’ve been able to borrow courage from
me and the work of analysis to tell your story. Still, I am intrigued by the
timing of your question on how I work.” A decisive dialogue follows:
SHE: The decision to leave the tunnel (a metaphor from recurrent dream
imagery) follows the awareness that the anal chamber is a dangerous
place. It kills! At least it bruises.
I: Please continue.
SHE: Wild animals can maul you. If there is a Brazilian or Siberian trainer
you may be bruised. [Laughing in recognition of how transparent the
dream to which she was referring was, she continued as follows:] But if
your trainer is African, he can leap frog with the tigers and still be safe.
When you are with an African you are unambiguously male or female,
not Caucasian or bisexual. You can choose between barren land and an
alternative route [again referring to another dream]…
I: Where growth takes place.
SHE: The genital area.
Whereas Patient A used her discomfort with my Otherness to feed a crucial
negative transference that spoke to her disgust with her mother who in her
eyes was inferior and unready to deliver her, Patient B used my Otherness to
facilitate her intrapsychic story of being unconsciously male to becoming a
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woman. She had mentalized a defective mother who wished she had been
born a boy and a father who threatened to shoot her in her vagina just when
she was discovering sexuality in adolescence. Thanks to an analysis that she
described as gentle and purposeful, she was able to overturn her pathological
organization that interfered with her capacity to form lasting relationships.
Patient C
Patient C was a nine year old African-American female child adopted by
two Caucasian adoptive parents of Finno-Ugric origin. How would she ne-
gotiate my Otherness as a Ghanaian analyst?
We know that the child patient noticed from the very beginning the
difference in skin color between herself and her mother and showed her con-
fusion, from the moment of discernment, how unlike her father she was. She
is darker skinned than her father is. She came to learn that her biological
mother is white and was shown a picture of her. She came to learn that her
biological father is black. She noticed furthermore that her two siblings who
were also adopted have mixed complexions. She is the only clearly dark skin-
ned child in her family, her adoptive mother, the only clearly light skinned
member of the family. I surmised earlier in her treatment that the interplay
between adoption and contrasts in skin color were going to be significant and
that her appropriation of these external fields of reference into the interior of
her mental world would be an important aspect of her intrapsychic story.
Falling down the stairs at nearly one year of life and sustaining massive
injuries was a major contributor to the patient’s mistrust in dependency and
her refusal to walk, which fundamentally begins with walking away from
one’s parents. From where, from a child’s viewpoint, would come the confi-
dence to come and go? In protest, she would take a big bite out of everybody’s
time: biting mother’s hands, biting even the family dog, enslave mother to do
her bidding, demanding her mother’s constant attention and care day and
night, intruding into the parental bedroom at night, and so forth. A massive
oral fixation had allowed her to cognitively and tentatively move into latency
and enjoy school, the only obvious pleasure in her life with all the predictable
structures which allow her to learn. In contrast, the hold-up at the libidinal
level created havoc at home, and she could not fulfill her considerable affect
hunger. These were my questions as we began. How would our patient show
me how she transferred the events of history, the story of adoption and skin dif-
ference, into a personal and interior sense of history? How would she demon-
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strate the mentalization of her history in the session conducted by a dark-
skinned Ghanaian-born analyst? How would the representations of her self
and object world enter into the transference? Would she be capable of working
in the transference?
During the fourth quarter of the first year, she took charge of her ses-
sions more authoritatively than ever before. Now she wrote imaginative
stories, sometimes inviting me to play Scrabble, and when she was not
doing that, she was showing me the scientific method she had learned at
school. There was now considerable distance away from libidinal and ag-
gressive trends unleashing sublimation potential. Symbolization was now
in full bloom. She often replicated the school projects in her sessions.
During the first half of the second year of analysis, we revisited color
differences and proceeded to transcend them. Her interest this time was in
historical figures, such as Rev. Martin Luther King Jr. and Rosa Parks and
their contributions to history. She wrote essays about them and asked me to
listen after she had finished writing. When she was not writing history
essays, she was doing projects on sharks, whales, and tigers. When I inter-
preted to her how intrigued I was to see a child who once bit everything in
sight showing interest in sharks, whales, and tigers, she beamed and said:
“I used to bite everything, even the couch. But that was a very long time ago. Come
and see my computer print-out on sharks. This is interesting. See how much they
eat; how far they can see; how fast they can swim!”
As she consolidated her position in latency she advanced along another
track: adopting her parents as her own. In a parents’ session, her father re-
ported that Dona had corrected a teacher in a way that he found most touch-
ing. A teacher complimented Dona for her systematic note keeping and
added, “That’s my girl.” Dona reportedly stunned the teacher by saying,
“Only my father gets to call me that.” The teacher apologized and took plea-
sure in telling the parents about this episode. Mr. K. teared up as he told me
this story. I interpreted to him that once upon a time he had claimed her for
his child. Now she is claiming him for a father. He thanked me for that obser-
vation and confessed the following: “When we brought Dona to you, you
said something like: ‘let’s do what we can to prepare Dona to be a young
woman amongst women, even a matriarch.’ We thought you were crazy. We
couldn’t imagine that day. Now we can. She is quite a girl.”
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IN PLACE OF A CONCLUSION
Twice in my career I had made the motivated error, so to speak, of using the
word matriarch and received a tongue-lashing. Each time I turned out to be
right: the creation of a leader with tremendous self-definition who could
stay inside her skin and claim herself was in bloom. Each time I used this
expression, I was rebuked at the time, reminded later, and thanked. Who is
this respected internal Other that simultaneously tricks and informs me
prematurely that some new creation is in the works? Who are these internal
figures who provide a gyroscope, as it were, for engaging patients in this
way with cryptic language? To be sure, a grandmother who says, “Woman
is to be respected.” A grandfather who taught me discretion. A mother who
says, “When your job is large, you do it all.” A father who says, “You can
laugh even in the face of adversity.” Our internal objects provide us with
internal structures of experience that resonate with psychologically charged
external fields of reference. Perhaps, intellectually, Husserl was right when
he indicated that intuition was the first principle.
Finally, no one, in my view speaks to Otherness more poetically than
the French phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Let us close with these
words:
In life the essence of consciousness is communication, where one cannot
determine what is ours and what belongs to others. Our perception of
others is a modification of ourselves. Man is a sorcerer for man. We are
co-responsible for what the other does. The true cogito…is this experi-
ence of a view which, in principle, is open towards others even if it is not
yet known by others.15
I hope I have provided enough theoretical, clinical, and integrative
reflections about identity and difference in ways that will allow others to
reflect on how difference and identity play out in their clinical pastoral
work as they negotiate issues of race, racialization, and vicissitudes of
Otherness. I hope I have done so with a plea of humility and openness to
difference in how others might handle the same material I have presented.
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“Interreligious and intercultural pastoral care (including counsel-
ing) is contextual care. The cultural and religious context is always
realized, observed, and brought into the relationship….Interreligious
and intercultural care is relationship work on a rational and emotion-
al basis. In all areas of difference, caregivers and conversationpart-
ners look at points of mutual contact in understanding and for the
common ground of our shared humanity.”
Helmut Weiss
“Interreligious and Intercultural Pastoral Care and
Counseling: Notes from a German Perspective”
—From Interfaith Spiritual Care: Understandings and Practices
